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For four weeks in mid-1860, Māori chiefs gathered at the Anglican missionary 
centre at Kohimārama near Auckland, having been invited by Governor 
Browne to gather and discuss issues with government representatives. The 
Kohimārama Conference was a significant political event at which Māori 
voiced their opinions on a number of topics, but the meeting’s relevance 
to the government was relatively short-lived, its importance effectively 
marginalized by subsequent events, in particular the 1863-1872 conflicts, 
confiscation, the Native Land Court, and other colonial developments. 
However, this month-long meeting retained or regained a significance within 
Māoridom, with some Māori leaders of the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century referencing the kawenata (covenant) of Kohimārama in their efforts 
to assert rangatiratanga within their relationship with the Crown. Historians 
largely ignored the event until Claudia Orange’s 1979 New Zealand Journal 
of History article entitled ‘The Covenant of Kohimarama: A Ratification of 
the Treaty of Waitangi’.1 As the title indicates, Orange places the conference 
firmly within a Treaty of Waitangi paradigm. Indeed, Orange’s work, 
together with some other pivotal texts emerging from the 1970s,2 has been 
instrumental in creating a Treaty-framed historiography, and her reading 
has been further processed within other academic or governmental writings, 
especially Waitangi Tribunal reports, although a few counter-interpretations 
have also appeared, as discussed below.
 While acknowledging that Kohimārama has a place within Treaty 
historiography, this essay seeks a broader reading of what the conference 
meant at the time. As Mark Francis states, ‘intra-communal rituals were 
not only dramatic, they were functional as well. They were designed to 
create fear or awe among a native group, and, at the same time, make the 
group well-disposed towards the British.’3 In 1860 the government was 
attempting to assert its rule over Māori through both moral suasion and 
military aggression and staged the Kohimārama Conference, with over 200 
supposedly friendly chiefs participating, as an act of political theatre aimed 
at both the players and the many observers. Even if fear and awe were not 
fully realized, the government endeavoured to project an image of Māori 
accord with its policies. It then re-presented the event textually to a wider 
Māori audience through its bilingual newspaper, Te Karere Maori, with 
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conference attendees receiving the relevant issues bound in book form.4 The 
conference did not go unnoticed among the Pākehā population, with reports 
published in their newspapers across the country. Using these texts, and other 
archival sources, this essay argues that, for the Crown, Kohimārama was 
less a renewal of its 1840 covenant with Māori than an event, which took 
place in a time of political and military stress, by which the government 
attempted to gain Māori acquiescence of its policies, and to publicize this 
to a wider Māori and Pākehā audience.
 Claudia Orange, in her article ‘The Covenant of Kohimarama’ and her 
book, The Treaty of Waitangi, sees Kohimārama almost exclusively in 
terms of chiefs striving to assert their mana, or construct a partnership with 
the state within a Treaty framework. She stresses the governor’s opening 
speech which ‘dwel[t] at length on the Treaty’s clauses [and] repeat[ed] 
the pledges made in 1840’,5 and that the native minister, Donald McLean, 
encouraged participants to consider the conference as ‘ “a fuller ratification” ’, 
which culminated in ‘the final [sic] resolution of the conference, effectively 
a ratification of the treaty c[oming] to be known as the Kohimarama 
covenant’.6 Orange is relatively circumspect on Crown motives, stating 
‘that the Governor was threatening a withdrawal of Crown obligations 
under the treaty, and making that agreement conditional on a continuing 
Maori acceptance of government authority’.7 However, she also implies that 
Donald McLean, who presided over the conference, in his reiteration of 
the governor’s speech ‘played down the crucial transfer of power involved’ 
and that his translation of Māori ‘giv[ing] up completely . . . all the rights 
and power of government’ failed to convey explicitly ‘the abstract national 
sovereignty’ the Crown claimed.8 Although she makes clear that McLean 
was attempting to manipulate the conference in order to gain the results 
the government desired, her assessment that his referring to Kohimārama as 
‘a fuller ratification’ of the Treaty was an endorsement of Māori aspirations 
fails to recognize that some present may have interpreted it as a ratification 
of state control.9
 Subsequent writers, some with rather less realistic assessments of 
Kohimārama, have not always matched Orange’s relative moderation, and 
seek to unequivocally posit the conference within a tino rangatiratanga 
discourse. For example, one Waitangi Tribunal report suggests that Māori 
chiefs ‘met at Kohimarama (Auckland) to debate and endorse the Treaty, 
debate the Governor’s proposed policies, and offer him their collective advice’ 
as if the Crown was making a genuine attempt at partnership. It states, ‘Gore 
Browne appears to have envisaged genuine power-sharing with an annual 
“Native Conference” ’, a ‘model for how the Crown could or should have 
acted’ and ‘a virtual Maori parliament’, and ‘the continuation and evolution 
of the Kohimarama Conference would have made Maori powerful at the 
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heart of the State, the top tier of government’.10 The Orakei report even 
suggests that Ngāti Whātua chief Pāora Tūhaere was given, in the spirit of 
partnership, the honour of chairing the 1860 meeting.11 The Treaty becomes 
central to Kohimārama, with one recent government document stating:
Discussions centered on the meaning of the Treaty, and proceedings of 
the meetings convey the chiefs’ understanding of the nature of the Treaty 
relationship. A unanimous resolution – the Kohimarama Covenant - was 
passed by the conference, recognising the sovereignty of the Crown, 
an act that has been described as a ‘ratification of the Treaty’ which 
affirmed the rangatiratanga of the chiefs.12
Such is the positivity surrounding Kohimārama that one academic describes 
the meeting as perhaps New Zealand’s ‘first national health hui’.13 However, 
as the government’s own rhetoric and subsequent events make clear, any 
kind of autonomy that might devolve to Māori would be restricted and 
under Crown control.14 Given such readings, it is perhaps surprising that a 
few right-wing commentators have also delved into the reported speeches 
from Kohimārama to come up with completely contrary interpretations. 
David Round, for example, suggests that Kohimārama provides ample 
proof of Māori acceptance of Crown sovereignty, and the omission of any 
discussion of the conference in the nation’s history books ‘contributes to the 
widely-perpetrated anti-colonial understanding of our history and general 
white liberal guilt complex’.15 A similar unnuanced reading, with selected 
excerpts from the English translation of the speeches, graced a copy of 
Investigate magazine to suggest that chiefs had rejected tino rangatiratanga in 
1860.16 Kohimārama also now features in the right-wing Centre for Political 
Research’s anti-Treaty rhetoric.17
 It may well be that those who seek to find validation for current 
stances on the Treaty within the recorded speeches of chiefs who attended 
Kohimārama are missing the point,18 and this essay seeks to provide a more 
contextualized reading. Neither the Crown, nor the Māori who attended the 
conference in 1860, were worried so much about the Treaty of Waitangi as 
about other pressing political concerns. While some chiefs did discuss the 
Treaty, they were a minority: of the 371 recorded speeches and published 
papers given by Māori, only 26 mentioned the Treaty at all.19 None of eight 
resolutions agreed to by the chiefs at the close of the conference actually 
referenced the Treaty, although the first (which Orange considers ‘in effect a 
ratification of the treaty’) affirmed ‘the mana of the Queen’ while alluding 
to the conference itself (not the Treaty) as a kawenata.20 However, the Treaty 
was not the primary reason the chiefs met. As other historians have noted 
(even when their focus has been on the Treaty), Governor Browne invited 
chiefs to attend mainly to gain their support over the war in Taranaki and 
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against the Kīngitanga,21 or to gain ‘subordination of the native race to the 
authority of the Crown’.22 These issues, and that the conference served as 
an immense propaganda exercise on the part of the government to achieve 
these aims, comprise the context within which to read the conference.
 When Māori chiefs met at Kohimārama the Treaty certainly came up for 
discussion. Mason Durie has identified changes in both Crown and Māori 
attitudes to the Treaty over time. Before 1860, Māori, whose mana was still 
real and substantive, maintained a relative indifference to the Treaty.23 It 
was the Crown, not yet exercising condign power over Māori, who pursued 
their Treaty right, as they saw it, of sovereignty. Thus Governor Browne, 
whose opening address framed subsequent discussion that followed on the 
Treaty, while expounding the property rights Māori derived from the Treaty 
(based on the English-language version of the Treaty) also explained those 
benefits as the price they had to pay for the Treaty.
4. In return for these advantages the Chiefs who signed the Treaty of 
Waitangi ceded for themselves and their people to Her Majesty the Queen 
of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers 
of sovereignty which they collectively or individually possessed or might 
be supposed to exercise of possess [translation: source].
McLean’s translation in Māori can be back-translated as:
4. So, the chiefs who signed their names to that document, the Covenant 
of Waitangi, were intending it as the price for those benefits they received. 
That was a resolution [ritenga] for themselves and their tribes, that they 
give up completely to the Queen of England all the rights [tikanga] and 
power [mana] of government from them all, and from each of them, and 
all things like that considered to be theirs [translation: LP].24
The translation, which Orange believes glosses over the transfer of 
‘sovereignty’, perhaps struggles with the limited Māori-language political 
lexicon at the time, but should be read in the context of his avoidance of 
the term ‘tino rangatiratanga’, and the governor’s remarks on the Kīngitanga 
in his opening address. This movement had not only established its own 
independent leadership, but its supporters had fought against the Crown in 
Taranaki leading Browne to describe the movement as ‘an act of disobedience 
and defiance to Her Majesty which cannot be tolerated [source].’25 Adding 
that those Māori who did not accept the Crown’s authority risked losing the 
Treaty’s guarantees of protection, Browne threatened Māori that ‘the result 
will be that many evils will befall the Māori people, and the destruction 
through which they will disappear [LP].’26
 The Taranaki war, and the risk of it escalating, were of immediate political 
importance to the government. Race relations were at a particularly low 
ebb in 1860. Many Māori believed they had not experienced the expected 
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fruits of the two preceding decades of colonization, and that the government 
was more concerned with purchasing land for settlers than providing good 
governance for Māori. Officials’ land-buying efforts often led to tensions, 
sometimes war, between differing Māori groups contesting ownership. North 
Taranaki in particular was the scene of a number of murders and fights about 
which the government appeared to have little concern. Some Māori tribes 
sought to combine in order to resist land sales, and maintain peace and 
stability within their communities. This trend to amalgamate culminated in 
the formation of the Kīngitanga in the late 1850s, a loose confederation with 
strong support in the central North Island, and moderate backing in other 
parts of the island south of Auckland. In 1859 a low-ranking Te Äti Awa 
chief offered land at Waitara for sale to the government. With minimal 
investigation into the title and in the face of opposition from the tribal leader, 
Wiremu Kīngi Te Rangitāke, Governor Browne pressed ahead with the 
purchase, precipitating the first Taranaki war in March 1860. Browne chose to 
interpret Te Rangitāke’s assertion of chiefly rights and subsequent resistance 
not as a defence of his land rights, but as a challenge to the government’s 
sovereignty. Te Rangitāke in his turn appealed to the Kīngitanga for help. 
By the time the Kohimārama Conference convened, government forces 
had won a debatable victory at Waireka, and just been beaten decisively at 
Puketakauere in June, with the settlers effectively hemmed in to the town 
of New Plymouth. Even as the conference was closing, Governor Browne 
acknowledged privately that ‘the Taranaki news is worse and worse’.27
 With both neighbouring Taranaki tribes and Kīngitanga forces joining 
the fight against the Crown, the government was concerned lest other tribes 
also decided to enter the fray. Eliza Stack noted in her diary at the time 
‘the suspicion which had taken root in the native mind that the English 
intended to dispossess them of their lands’.28 One month into the war McLean 
suggested a conference, stating that it was ‘a means of preventing what would 
be much more costly a general native war. It would be imprudent, at the 
present juncture, that those Natives whose feelings are friendly should not be 
reassured & confirmed in their friendly sentiments.’29 On the conclusion of 
the conference, as he contemplated a second meeting, he described it as ‘a 
safety valve’ and ‘the means . . . of imbuing the Native mind with correct 
views as respects measures of the Government to the success of which their 
concurrence and cooperation is absolutely essential’, as a ‘means [by which] 
Her Majesty’s aboriginal subjects may be more effectively controlled and 
governed’.30 In a similar tone, C.W. Richmond, the minister of native affairs, 
considered more conferences necessary because ‘It could not be expected to 
bring the Natives to our views at once.’31 Francis Dillon Bell also considered 
that the conference had been an effective counter against the Kīngitanga, 
and that a further meeting might discuss individualized land tenure.32
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 If the governor’s opening speech failed to awe or frighten Māori, then 
certainly the rest of the conference’s organization was designed to gain a 
better disposition from those attending. The conference was probably not 
too onerous, with chiefs assembling for about three hours most days, with 
weekends off. Certainly, they were reasonably cared for. Although the 
Southern Cross had feared the ‘gluttony’ of a Māori feast,33 the Wellington 
Independent happily reported:
The lodgement for the Chiefs was good, yet not extravagant; the provision 
was substantial and abundant, yet not luxurious or too profuse. The 
whares were weatherboard, and raised a sufficient height to keep the 
inmates free from the effects of damp. The provision was good ‘John 
Bull’ fare – but no more liberal than Maori Chiefs made for their 
Pakeha guests.34
The chiefs had been conveyed on chartered vessels,35 lived at Kohimārama 
in Pākehā-style houses, ate Pākehā food, and engaged in körero according 
to Pākehā rules of engagement. There appears to have been little of the 
excess and ritualistic pomp that accompanied assemblies in colonial India in 
which British governors sought to elevate themselves above their indigenous 
‘subjects’.36 For the most part McLean represented the face of government, 
with the governor present only to open and close the conference. As the 
meeting was ending, McLean suggested to Browne that ‘It would have an 
excellent effect with the chiefs if you would come down to dine with them 
tomorrow.’ McLean was careful to project sufficient, but not excessive, 
gubernatorial dignity, suggesting that ‘something in the way of distinction 
should be worn by you but not full uniform’.37 The governor’s table would 
be covered with a cloth, but he would share the same fare as the chiefs. 
This was an opportunity for Māori to get close and converse with the 
governor with what might appear to be relative equality. Te Karere Maori 
suggested the chiefs ‘really appreciated that sign of love [LP]’.38 One chief 
compared the dinner to the Last Supper, in the way that those present were 
now connected with the governor.
Do you not consider that we have dined in company with the Governor, 
and that he has spoken words to you? If one tribe take food with 
another tribe that implies the establishment of love (between them). In 
like manner, Christ, when he had finished his work, took bread with 
his disciples. This was the way in which he confirmed his love to his 
apostles. In what direction can you fly now? for you have taken food 
with the Governor [source].39
The chiefs, as McLean well knew, were under an obligation to the government. 
It is perhaps not surprising that Rënata Kawepö, who had refused to attend, 
disparagingly described those who did as ‘Lick-plates’.40
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 The conference, as participatory performance, was paired textually with 
a printed version of the speeches. It is not altogether clear to what extent 
these present the complete speeches – certainly there was almost none of 
the banter one would expect at this sort of meeting – but the government 
was keen to give an impression that the chiefs could speak openly, and 
reported that minutes were returned to chiefs to check they were happy with 
what was recorded.41 The speeches needed to appear correct, as they were 
disseminated to a wider Māori audience through the government’s bilingual 
fortnightly or monthly newspaper, Te Karere Maori, although it appears that 
the conference secretary, Walter Buller, ‘condensed as much as possible, but 
gave the Governor’s messages and [McLean’s] speeches in full’.42 That the 
government considered news of the conference important in ‘imbuing the 
Native mind with correct views’ can be seen in the extent of its coverage, 
and that Browne’s opening speech was published and disseminated just four 
days after the start of the meeting. Although the conference ran for only four 
weeks, the newspaper’s content was devoted to the event for five months. 
When normal issues were generally about 12 pages long, the six issues on 
the conference comprise 298 pages, averaging almost 50 pages per issue.43 
Just as the government’s newspaper sometimes utilized letters from Māori 
supporting its position, the conference was about not just getting chiefs 
publicly on side, but ensuring that they were seen to do so in the printed 
record.
 Although Te Karere Maori denied that the conference was called primarily 
over Taranaki and the Kīngitanga,44 no one was under any illusion. As Waka 
Nene stated, ‘I am searching for the cause of why we are here; it is with Te 
Rangitāke, or the King? [LP].’45 These political and military objectives were 
closely entwined with the overall colonial project. As one Pākehā spectator 
(unnamed but perhaps a government official) at the conference noted, the 
governor had invited the chiefs to Kohimārama with three main aims:
1st. To the suppression of existing war and the prevention of such evils 
in the future.
2nd. To the more speedy settlement by Europeans of what are now 
purely native districts.
3rd. To the amelioration of the natives themselves – their advancement 
in the scale of civilivation [sic], and their amalgamation (so to speak) 
with their European neighbours.
He added, ‘The “thin edge of the wedge” has been inserted and those who 
are conversant with native affairs can fairly appreciate the advantage thus 
gained.’46
 In the first few days the chiefs displayed a general sympathy towards 
Te Rangitāke and Te Āti Awa, or at least an anti-war rhetoric that arbitration 
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was preferable to war, and McLean endeavoured to steer the conference in 
the right direction. Just over a week into the conference, to counter pro-
Te Rangitāke sentiments, the native secretary spent a whole day giving 
a history of the North Taranaki region, from the time of the 1839 New 
Zealand Company purchase to the present, detailing the various times that 
both Taranaki Māori and Waikato had been paid for land there, even reading 
out a number of documents verbatim.
The Taranaki people are now asserting a claim to territory which has 
become the property of the Government. Waikato has taken up arms 
to hold that which their own chiefs gave to the Europeans; spreading it 
forth for their acceptance in the light of day and under the shining sun 
of heaven. Had it been territory not previously touched or broken into, 
the case would have been different, but it was not so. The land has been 
consumed; it cannot return to its original state any more than the ashes 
of a dead fire can be rekindled. Let the Chiefs of the Council look at 
the facts of the case and consider them well [source].47
McLean very carefully avoided discussion of the military situation, with 
just a brief mention of the Puketakauere disaster which he disingenuously 
suggested had resulted in heavy Māori losses.48 Such was McLean’s 
manipulation of the facts that many Māori appeared to swing in behind the 
government position. Some chiefs wanted to go to Taranaki to talk sense 
to Te Rangitāke, but McLean dissuaded them.49 Ultimately, the government 
was able to project an image of chiefly support for its stand on the Waitara 
dispute, with the passing of a resolution on Taranaki: ‘That this Conference 
having heard explained the circumstances which led to the war at Taranaki, 
is of opinion that the Governor was justified in the course taken by him; 
that Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake himself provoked the quarrel; and that 
the proceedings of the latter are wholly indefensible [source].’50 Although 
moved and seconded by Māori, the wording in both languages suggests that 
these were drafted by government officials rather than Māori themselves, 
as does a letter from McLean to Browne.51 In the reporting of the vote, 
Te Karere Maori was able to note that even a chief renowned for being 
anti-government voted for this resolution:
Mr. McLean said again, ‘Let those Chiefs who approve lift up their 
hands.’ There was a good deal of confusion. Te Makarini Te Uhiniko 
got up and said, ‘My reason for rising is that I do not see many hands 
lifted up.’ Herewini Te Amohau, rising up, addressed Te Makarini Te 
Uhiniko thus: ‘Your opposition to the Governor is of old; that seems to 
be your chief work.’ Te Makarini replied, ‘I am not opposing now, for 
I lifted up my hand.’ [source] 52
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Ultimately the government was able to claim that the chiefs present 
unanimously signed a document agreeing to the resolutions, which included 
recognition of the Queen’s mana and condemnation of the Kīngitanga, with 
just three chiefs objecting to the resolution on Taranaki.
 The conference largely fulfilled the government’s desires, notwithstanding 
the huge cost of at least £4,250.53 They were keen to project an image 
that most of the chiefs accepted the governor’s actions in Taranaki, and 
that all present had unanimously condemned the Kīngitanga, as seen in 
Te Karere Maori’s reporting that ‘These resolutions, with one exception, 
were carried unanimously. We are, therefore, pleased to find that the foolish 
project of a “Maori King,” to which we adverted in a former number, is so 
unhesitatingly condemned by a large body of most influential and intelligent 
Maories [source].’54 Te Haeata, the newspaper of the Methodist Mission, 
which gave strong support to the government over Taranaki, echoed similar 
sentiments:
The opinion, that of most of the people of the Conference, is that 
Te Rangitāke is the cause of the trouble at Taranaki. . . .
What they [Māori] really want is to stick with the Pākehā, that they 
should love the Pākehā and the Pākehā should love the Māori. . . .
The establishment of the king was an issue of discussion of that 
Conference. There was great objection to this thing. To them, this was 
the cause of the troubles of this country. . . .
. . . they thought all Māori should live under the protection of the Queen, 
there should be one law for the country, for both Māori and Pākehā, 
the same for both [LP].55
Despite these assertions, some coverage of the conference in the settler 
press made it clear that not all chiefs had been convinced by government 
arguments over Taranaki. The Anglican missionary voice was generally 
critical of the war, and Hugh Carleton, the son-in-law of Reverend Henry 
Williams and editor of the Daily Southern Cross, was prepared to cast doubt 
on the government’s claims:56
On the Chairman putting the Resolution, about one third held up their 
hands. (Considerable confusion). Chairman called attention to the fact 
that in the earlier part of the Conference they had blamed (Whakahe) the 
Governor, for the war at Taranaki; but that he having enlightened them on 
the question at issue, he understood that they were now convinced to the 
contrary, (some irregular talk among the Natives – private conversation 
between the Chairman and the assistant Native Secretary). Chairman 
again put Resolution III. About the same number (one third) held up 
their hands, (further confusion – some little talking). Chairman did not 
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call upon those who disapproved of the motion to put up their hands, 
but called upon W. TAMEHANA to move Res. IV.57
Soon after, the Cross published a letter from Reverend Robert Burrows, an 
Anglican missionary. Burrows reported that, despite just one third support 
for the resolution by show of hands, ‘after the Chairman had declared the 
Conference closed . . . the great majority of these men had been induced 
to attach their signatures to those Resolutions as a whole’, and he learnt 
that ‘some of them had afterwards expressed their ignorance of what they 
had signed’. He remonstrated with officials at the Native Office, but then 
expressed surprise at claims in the New-Zealander that the chiefs had 
adopted all the resolutions. As one ‘conversant with the native language, 
and the working of the native mind’, he believed that the chiefs ‘were not 
at all prepared to throw the whole onus of that war upon the shoulders of 
“Wiremu Kingi.” ’
The Native Conference had not been sitting many days before it appeared 
evident to those, that the unhappy Taranaki war was not only uppermost 
in their thoughts, but some of the chiefs present began to express their 
minds very freely and to plead for a cessation of hostilities. It soon 
became evident that nothing short of reply from the Governor on the 
subject would satisfy them. On the 19th of July the Message of his 
Excellency was printed in the ‘New Zealander’ of Saturday last, was 
read to them, prefaced by a long account from Mr. McLean, respecting 
the Taranaki land question, which also appeared in the above named 
paper. The Chairman’s address, and the Governor’s Message together, 
tended to enlighten some, and to silence others, but many who were 
silent were not satisfied, and in this state I believe they remained up to 
the close of the Conference.58
The Cross published a rebuttal from H.T. Clarke, the resident magistrate 
of Bay of Plenty, in which he argued that the chiefs had had ample time 
to discuss the resolutions which ‘were then eagerly signed by one hundred 
and seven of the Chiefs’.59
 Aspersions were also cast that government had largely bought the support 
of the chiefs. The Cross thought not only that the government’s hospitality 
was likely to have moderated criticism from the chiefs, but also that ‘the 
meeting had been under the influence of presents’.60 Near the end of the 
conference, Mātene Te Whiwhi asserted his loyalty to the Crown, then stated, 
‘Here also is a word of mine: do not be grieved Mr. McLean. Let the warmth 
rest upon the Maori, as it does upon the Pakeha’, which Te Karere glossed 
with ‘[Meaning that the members of the Conference should receive pay.] 
[source]’.61 This a correspondent to the Southern Cross interpreted as:
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A Southern Chief, of celebrity, spoke somewhat to this effect. The 
chiefs having been called to the Conference by the Governor to express 
themselves in his favour, they had responded to his call, and uttered 
words in his rooms favourable to his policy, therefore a reward should 
be given to each chief in the shape of hard cash. This truthful one was 
confronted by the Land Commissioner [McLean], and the matter hushed 
up as speedily as possible.62
The issue continued after the conference, with claims from the Wellington 
Independent that chiefs from their province had received shotguns,63 and 
questions in Parliament on ‘the amount of money paid as presents’.64 
Changing circumstances soon made all such discussion irrelevant. Soon after, 
Grey replaced Browne as governor and no more nationwide conferences were 
called. Kohimārama, at least for Pākehā, was soon forgotten.
 The third criticism, trumpeted by the parliamentary ‘opposition’, was that 
the assembled chiefs were not representative of Māori as a whole. William 
Fox, as reported in the Southern Cross, suggested, ‘the Native Secretary had 
leave to select those Natives who suited his purpose’, and James Fitzgerald 
described them as ‘a happy family’. Fox also suggested that McLean had 
failed to invite some important chiefs, and others had been asked too late.65 
Chiefs came and went, with 112 listed as present on the first day, perhaps 
a hundred arriving subsequently and 107 still remaining to ‘unanimously’ 
sign the resolutions on the final day.66 Taranaki was not represented, and 
Waikato barely so. While it is fair to say that most areas had some chiefs 
present, some had much greater representation than others. The government 
put the non-attendance down to a number of factors: there had been a 
recent epidemic; Taranaki chiefs did not want to leave home at a time of 
war; and Waikato were mourning the death of Te Wherowhero.67 It is likely 
that some refusals stemmed from more political motives. For example, 
only five Hauraki chiefs from 21 invited accepted the offer, a stance Paul 
Monin attributes to ‘diminished confidence in government Maori policy and, 
conversely, increased support for the Kingitanga’.68
 Māori had a variety of attitudes towards the conference. Some Māori were 
clearly unenthusiastic about Kohimārama and talk of a further meeting, as 
the government was aware. Grey, in deciding not to stage a second event 
in 1861, considered it not ‘wise to call a number of semi-barbarous Natives 
together to frame a Constitution for themselves’.69 He claimed that, ‘when 
the last Conference was summoned to Kohimarama, some Natives refused 
to attend it; other Chiefs of importance threw, and still throw, ridicule upon 
the whole affair’. Waikato, he asserted, had been offended by the remarks 
from some of their former enemies, but would also be unwilling to cooperate 
in a government-run institution, an act which would run counter to their 
own claims to sovereignty.70 Thomas Smith, as assistant native secretary, 
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also cautioned Browne against a second conference, as a chief chosen 
would be placed ‘in an invidious position, and that by identifying him with 
the Government under present circumstances it would tend to impair the 
influence which he might otherwise exercise’.71 On the other hand, some 
chiefs may have enjoyed a trip to Auckland and hospitality at the state’s 
expense; others the opportunity to mix with and debate important issues 
with other chiefs and government officials, or to assert their loyalty in 
uncertain times. Attitudes will have depended on particular tribal responses 
to government policy and the political situation. Bay of Islands chiefs, for 
example, subsequently held meetings to discuss what had transpired at 
Kohimārama. As H.T. Kemp reported, rather obliquely, to McLean, ‘The 
opening address of his Excellency was publicly read and freely commented 
on by the people present, who seemed to take great interest in it.’72 Pāora 
Tūhaere, with mana whenua over Kohimārama itself, unsuccessfully 
requested a second conference in 1869, and subsequently organized his own 
meetings in the 1870s and 1880s.73 Chiefs at the conference would have been 
well aware of government motives and exhibited what Michael Allen has 
termed (in his discussion of Crown–Māori interaction of mid-1880) ‘political 
ambivalence’. When encountering Pākehā officialdom, Māori leaders might 
contest specific policies but would also pragmatically acknowledge the 
Crown’s mana, or request governmental redress for their grievances.74
 Outside of military actions, the Kohimārama Conference was perhaps the 
largest and most expensive single event the government had ever directed 
towards Māori in the first few decades of colonial rule, in terms both of 
the actual event and its accompanying printed material. Its purpose was 
to portray a racial inclusiveness bounded within British supremacy. As 
the magistrate A.J. Johnston told McLean, the conference ‘has not been 
useless’ and showed that government ‘moderation’ was desirable once ‘its 
power to quell insurrection had been made manifest’.75 McLean, as native 
secretary, stage-managed and directed proceedings, and was not above 
massaging facts, as in his narration of Taranaki’s recent history, or in how 
the resolution on the Taranaki war was presented textually to the public. 
Māori attitudes were divided as to the appropriateness of the conference, 
and Pākehā contemporaries differed in assessments of its effectiveness. 
While the chiefs were meeting, one writer for the Colonist considered that 
‘the government are most anxious that their native conference should appear 
worth the pains they have taken to bring it about’, but could not hide that 
it was ‘a complete failure as well as thorough sham’.76 A correspondent to 
the Wellington Independent considered the money well spent, and ‘the most 
favorable results may be anticipated’,77 as did Governor Browne himself.78 
However, the Colonist was perhaps closer to the truth when suggesting 
that the resolutions on Taranaki and the Kīngitanga ‘will be useful to us 
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at present; but too much reliance must not be placed upon them’.79 In more 
recent times Kohimārama has often been viewed purely through a Treaty 
lens, either as a proto-Treaty-compliant partnership on one side or evidence of 
Māori submission to Crown sovereignty on the other. Such views reflect the 
obsessions of our own time rather than those of Māori and Pākehā in 1860 
regarding the Taranaki war and the Kīngitanga, and privilege fragments of 
the bare textual record rather than a fuller and more contextualized reading 
of the event. McLean and some of the chiefs did discuss the Treaty, but 
Browne had effectively laid the foundation for that debate by offering a 
stark choice of accepting the Crown’s sovereignty or the possibility of racial 
destruction. The government’s aim for the rest of the conference was about 
aligning the chiefs present to its side, or at least convincing both Māori and 
Pākehā that they had managed to achieve this.
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